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ABSTRACT

THE IMPRESSION FORMATION PROCESSES OF ASYMMETRICALLY
DEPENDENT INDIVIDUALS
MAY 1993

LAURA

E.

STEVENS, B.A., ALLEGHENY COLLEGE

M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by:

Professor Susan T. Fiske

Two studies were performed in order to address the impression

formation processes dependent people in asymmetrical relationships use
to form impressions of the powerful other.

The first study investigated

the relationship between non-dependent, asymmetrically dependent, and

symmetncally dependent individuals.

It was hypothesized that compared

to non-dependent and symmetrically dependent subjects, task

asymmetrically subjects would use accuracy-oriented processes and
individuate the other person.

The second study investigated non-

dependent and evaluatively dependent individuals.

It was

hypothesized

that evaluatively dependent subjects would inaccurately, selectively

encode information about the other person in order to make the other
seem more positive.

The hypotheses were confirmed.

Impression

formation processes, prediction, control, and threats to self-esteem are
discussed.
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

Interdependence theory was first proposed by Thibaut and Kelley in
1959.

Since then, it has influenced a wide variety of research in

social psychology.

Research on topics ranging from bargaining and

negotiation to threat and trust have all incorporated some aspects of

interdependence theory (Chadwick-Jones, 1983).

Given the explosion of

social cognitive work in the last decade or more, it is odd that

interdependence theory has not appeared in that context.

One specific

social cognitive theory that has drawn on interdependence theory is

Fiske and Neuberg's (1990) continuum theory of impression formation.

In

its discussion of motives, this theory utilizes many ideas originally

discussed in the context of interdependence theory (see Riley & Fiske,
1991 for a review).

While interdependence theory has addressed both

symmetrical and asymmetrical dependence (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; see
also Kelley, 1979; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978), the interdependence-related

research on impression formation has dealt with only symmetrical

dependence.

Although some of the research on symmetrical dependence

could be generalized to asymmetrical dependence, asymmetrical dependence
is actually quite different and should be considered separately.

Asymmetrical Dependence

Dependence refers to the degree that an individual's outcomes
Thus, dependence reflects how much

depend on another person's actions.

control one person has over another person's outcomes.

Dependence is

other's outcomes
symmetrical when the control each person has over the
is reciprocal.

equally.
Each person can control the other's outcomes

asymmetrical as outcome control
On the other hand, dependence becomes
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.

becomes non-reciprocal.

One individual can control the other's

outcomes, but the other person is not capable of returning that control.
The discrepancy in the power to control outcomes that

characterizes asymmetrically dependent dyads leads to two possible
perspectives.

Asymmetrical relationships could be examined through the

eyes of the powerful person who has the ability to control.

Or, the

relationship could be approached from the perspective of the powerless
person who does not have the ability to control.

The perspective of the

powerful person has been addressed elsewhere (Goodwin & Fiske, 1993).

The perspective of the powerless member of the asymmetrically dependent

dyad will be addressed here.
By the definition stated earlier, the powerless in asymmetrically

dependent dyads do not have much ability to control the outcomes of the
powerful on whom their outcomes depend.
a tremendous loss of control

Thus, the powerless experience

over their own outcomes.

According to

Kelly's (1963) theory of personality, all individuals are motivated to

predict and control their own outcomes.

In addition,

it has been argued

that control over one's circumstances is integral to the self -concept
(Depret & Fiske, in press).

Given this, the powerless would be

motivated to find a way in which to cope with their lack of control.
If the asymmetrical

dependence itself could not be directly

challenged, the powerless would most likely try to gain indirect control

over their outcomes.

This would require the powerless to be able to

predict and control the behavior of the powerful.

In

order to do this,

form an impression
the powerless would have to seek out information and

of the powerful

2

Impression Formation

Fiske and Neuberg's (1990) continuum model of impression formation

posits that category-based processes of impression formation are the
default, but people shift toward more individuating processes of

impression formation when they are motivated to do so (see also Brewer,
1988).

These individuating processes are characterized by an increased

use of attribute information.

Research on impression formation has shown that this shift toward
the individuating processes of impression formation does occur under

conditions of symmetrical dependence (Berscheid, Graziano, Monson, &
Dermer, 1976; Erber & Fiske, 1984; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987; Ruscher &
Fiske,

1990; Ruscher, Fiske, Miki, & Van Manen, 1991).

The impression

formation processes of symmetrically dependent individuals are

characterized by increases in attention to the other person's
attributes.

By attending to the other person, potentially individuating

information is readily available.

Symmetrically dependent

individuals

are then able to base their impressions on this individuating

information rather than only on pre-existing stereotypes and

expectancies (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986).

On the

other hand, when people are not dependent on one another, impressions
are often based on pre-existing stereotypes and expectancies.

Because perceivers do subscribe to pre-existing stereotypes and
expectancies, any attribute information they later encounter can be

classified as consistent, inconsistent, or irrelevant with regard to
these pre-existing beliefs.

Consistent information is largely redundant

with a pre-existing belief and offers little new information.

On the

about
other hand, inconsistent information provides novel information
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the target person's dispositions, intentions, or future behavior.

Thus,

accuracy-oriented perceivers may prefer inconsistent to consistent
information because it is more informative about the target person.

In

fact, studies on cooperative and competitive symmetrical dependence

found that interdependent and non-interdependent individuals paid equal

attention to expectancy-consistent information, but interdependent
individuals paid significantly more attention to expectancy-inconsistent

information (Erber & Fiske, 1984; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990).

Moreover,

accuracy instructions have the same impact as symmetrical outcome

dependence (Neuberg & Fiske, 1987).
In addition,

many studies have shown that inconsistent information

requires more time to encode than consistent information (e.g.. Brewer,
Dull, & Lui, 1981; Hemsley & Marmurek, 1982).

This may be due to the

fact that perceivers are trying to make sense of the inconsistent

For example, they may be linking inconsistencies to

information.

Moreover, some

attributes already in memory (Srull & Wyer, 1989).

researchers argue that symmetrically dependent perceivers may be
spending their time making dispositional inferences (Berscheid et al.,
1976;

The inconsistent

Erber & Fiske, 1984; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990).

information does not fit the perceivers' expectancy.

Thus, the

perceivers may attribute the inconsistent information to individual

personality idiosyncracies (Jones & Davis, 1965).

These idiosyncracies

can later be used to help predict the target person's behavior.
Thus,

in symmetrical

dependence conditions, where each person's

individuals pay
outcomes are partially controlled by the other person,
about the
particular attention to expectancy-inconsistent attributes

other person.

potentially
This expectancy-inconsistent information is

4

more informative than expectancy-consistent information.

These

individuating processes of impression formation would allow

symmetrically dependent individuals to gain

a

greater sense of

prediction and control over their outcomes.
Impression Formation and Asymmetrical Interdependence

Analogously to symmetrically dependent individuals, asymmetrically
dependent individuals do not have complete control over their outcomes.
Therefore, it seems natural to assume that asymmetrically dependent

individuals would utilize individuating processes of impression
formation in the same kind of attempt to gain some control over their
outcomes.

In fact,

there is evidence to support this hypothesis.

Subjects in two recent studies by Depret and Fiske (1993) believed
they would be asymmetrically dependent on

a group of three

other people.

This group of three was described as heterogenous or homogenous.

The

heterogeneous group was predicted to elicit the same processes as
individual outcome dependence.

Since this paper deals with individual

outcome dependence, only the results for the heterogeneous group will be

presented here.

The groups were described as either low power, would

have minimal control over the subject's outcomes, or high power, would
have maximal control over the subject's outcomes.

While subjects in

both the low and high power heterogenous groups spent about equal time
on expectancy-consistent information about a target group member,

subjects in the high power heterogenous group spent more time on

expectancy-inconsistent information than subjects in the low power
heterogenous group.

In addition,

subjects in the high power condition

than subjects in the
made more dispositional inferences about the target

low power condition.

Overall, these results are very similar to the
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individuating impression formation processes used by symmetrically
dependent individuals.
Stevens and Fiske (1992) conducted a preliminary study which

concentrated solely on individual asymmetrical outcome dependence.
Subjects were either not dependent on the other or they were

asymmetrically dependent on the other.

While the asymmetrically

dependent subjects tended to spend more time overall on the information
about the other (M=76.55) than did non-dependent subjects (M=69.20),

F(l,50)=2.99, fi=.09, they did not distinguish between expectancy-

consistent and expectancy-inconsistent information (although standard
stimuli were used and freshly pretested).

Asymmetrically dependent

subjects did make more dispositional comments (M=4.00) than did non-

dependent subjects (M=2.45), F(l,50)=5.74, fi<.05, but, again, they did
not distinguish between expectancy-consistent and expectancy-

inconsistent information.
The three studies reviewed above suggest that, compared to non-

dependent individuals, asymmetrically dependent individuals will engage
in individuating processes of impression formation that are similar to

those used by symmetrically dependent individuals.

However, there do

appear to be some differences in these processes.
Individuating processes of impression formation may allow

symmetrically dependent individuals to gain

a good deal

of control over

their outcomes, but would individuating processes also allow

asymmetrically dependent individuals to regain all of their lost
control?

Asymmetrical dependence is not reciprocal.

Unlike a member

o

person cannot influence the
a symmetrically dependent dyad, a powerless

powerful person's outcomes to any degree.
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Thus,

it seems that the

powerless person in an asymmetrically dependent situation would have
less control than a person in a symmetrically dependent situation.

This

additional loss of control should motivate the powerless to be extremely

accurate about the person on whom they are asymmetrically dependent.
Thus, asymmetrically dependent subjects may be more accurate than

symmetrically interdependent subjects.
The critical issue is how this increase in accuracy motivation

would differentiate symmetrically and asymmetrically dependent subjects.
Findings from research on symmetrical dependence seem to shed some light
on this issue (Ruscher & Fiske,

1990; Ruscher, et al., 1991).

Both the

think-aloud protocols of subjects and the variability of their responses
suggest that some people discount the inconsistent information (which
seems not to be a fully accuracy-oriented process because they are not

using all the available information) while some people do incorporate
all the information (which seems to be a more accuracy-oriented process

because they are using all the available information).

In an

effort to

be accurate, subjects may accept all of the information they receive

about the powerful target as valid and use all of it.

By disagreeing

with or making an excuse for a piece of information, subjects are

discounting the information.

Thus, in an attempt to regain prediction

and control, asymmetrically dependent subjects should process

information accurately and should not discount the information they
receive about the powerful other person.

Asymmetrically dependent

subjects should do this more than not dependent or symmetrically

dependent subjects.
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Impression Formation and Asymmetrical Dependence on an Evaluator

While people are often in asymmetrically dependent relationships
like those described above, a more common type of asymmetrical

dependence is asymmetrical dependence on someone who is evaluating your
performance.

Evaluative dependence is quite different from asymmetrical

dependence related to concrete outcomes.

Not only does an evaluator

have control over the dependent person's tangible outcomes, but an

evaluator also provides information regarding the dependent person's
competence at a task.

Thus, an evaluator evokes some threat to the

dependent person's self-esteem.

So, dependent people not only rely on

an evaluator for their task outcomes, but they also rely on an evaluator

for information relevant to self-esteem.

Because these evaluatively

dependent people have more at stake (self-esteem in addition to tangible
outcomes) than purely outcome asymmetrically dependent people, they may
have even less of a sense of prediction and control.

Interestingly, Swann (Swann, 1990; Swann, Stein-Seroussi

,

&

Giesler, 1992) has shown that people have mixed motives when it comes to

self-perception.

They are motivated both to be accurate about their

traits and to maintain their self-esteem.

Although there is no evidence

addressing this point yet, it is probably true that these same mixed

motives would be evident in people's perception of others who have
control over the them.

Evaluatively dependent perceivers should seek

information about the evaluator, yet they should also monitor the
information in an attempt to maintain their self-esteem.

The most

the
effective way to protect one's self-esteem may be to picture

predictable, and
powerful other as competent; someone who is fair,

consistent.
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Kunda and Sanitioso (1989; see also Kunda, 1987) have proposed
and

supported the idea that motivation may cause changes in people's

temporary self -conceptions by guiding people's memory searches and
leading only to the activation of self-conceptions that are consistent

with the currently desired view of the self.

Analogously, in an attempt

to maintain their self-esteem, dependent people may engage in similar

kinds of changes in their conceptions of a powerful other who has some

impact on their feelings of self-worth.

These changes may be

accomplished via motivated biases in the search through information
about the powerful other.

In other words,

evaluatively dependent

perceivers would search for positive information about the evaluator.
In fact,

Pepitone (1950) found distortions in a positive direction in

subjects who were evaluatively dependent on a group of others.
Klein and Kunda (1992) have proposed that people who are motivated
to hold certain beliefs about others attempt to construct rational

justifications for their desired beliefs.

Thus, when confronted with

negative information about their evaluator, evaluatively dependent
people may attempt to discount that information in order to justify

their positive beliefs about the evaluator.
A preliminary study on evaluatively dependent individuals

conducted by Stevens and Fiske (1991) provides evidence on this point.
An expectancy (positive, negative) by information consistency

(consistent, inconsistent) interaction indicated that evaluatively
time
dependent subjects in the positive expectancy condition spent more

information) than
on expectancy-inconsistent information (the negative
on expectancy-consistent information.

Subjects in the negative

expectancy condition spent more time on expectancy-consistent
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information (also the negative information) than on expectancy-

inconsistent information.

Overall, subjects spent more time on negative

information (M=78.72) than positive information {M=69.88),
F(l,79)=22.18, B<.0001.

While initially this may seem to contradict the

prediction that evaluatively dependent people would search for positive
information about the evaluator, further inspection indicates it does
not.

A similar interaction revealed that subjects were discounting the

negative information (M=1.97) much more than the positive information
(M=0.19), F(l,79)=48.72, fi<.0001.

So, the increased time spent on

negative information was used to construct justification for the
subjects' otherwise positive view of the evaluator.

Unfortunately, this

study did not have a non-dependent control condition with which to
compare.

Summary
In summary,

symmetrically and asymmetrically dependent individuals

should form impressions in different ways.

To begin, symmetrically

dependent people have lost some control over their own outcomes, but
they have also retained some control over the other person (i.e., the

symmetrical nature of the dependence allows the dependent person to

influence the other person's outcomes as much as the other person
Therefore, it would be useful for

influences the dependent person's).

symmetrically dependent people to accurately process information about
the other person in an attempt to predict the other person's behavior.

Of course, symmetrically dependent people do not need to be extremely
accurate, although they can be, because they also have the means with

which to directly influence the other person's behavior.
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On the other hand, asymmetrically dependent individuals have lost

some control over their own outcomes, but they have not retained any
control over the other person (i.e., the asymmetrical nature of the

dependence dictates that the dependent person cannot affect the powerful
person's outcomes in any major way).

Thus, asymmetrically dependent

people should be motivated to process information about the powerful
person extremely accurately in an attempt to successfully predict the
powerful person's behavior.

They do not have any other guaranteed means

of control

Finally, like asymmetrically dependent people, evaluatively

dependent individuals also have lost some control over their outcomes

without retaining control over the other person.

In addition,

they have

lost some control over their self-esteem because they are subjected to

the evaluation of their performance, and competence is a central aspect
of self-esteem.

While evaluatively dependent people could be motivated

to be accurate in order to predict the other's evaluative behavior, the

personal threat is greater than for the other two types of dependence.

Therefore, evaluatively dependent people may interpret information about
the other person in a self -protective manner and conclude that a

seemingly incompetent other person is in fact competent because an

incompetent evaluator is threatening; an incompetent evaluator could be
unfair, inconsistent, wrong, and therefore unpredictable.

Two studies were performed in order to address the above

hypotheses regarding how the dependent person in an asymmetrical

relationship forms an impression of the powerful other.

The first study

asymmetrically
investigated the relationship between non-dependent,

11

dependent, and symmetrically dependent individuals.

The second study

concentrated on non-dependent and evaluatively dependent individuals.

12
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CHAPTER 2
EXPERIMENT

1

Method

Overview
An experimenter led subjects to believe that they would be working

with a fictitious other subject on a task.

In addition,

the

experimenter told the subjects they would be eligible for a prize based
on (a) their individual performance (no dependence),

(b)

their joint

performance with the fictitious subject who had already been paid a set
fee for participating (asymmetrical dependence), or

(c)

their joint

performance with the fictitious subject who also would be eligible for
prize based on their joint performance (symmetrical dependence).

a

The

fictitious subject was initially portrayed as competent (positive
expectation) or incompetent (negative expectation).

Subjects then

received both expectancy-consistent and expectancy-inconsistent

information about the fictitious subject and voiced their reactions to
that information into a tape recorder.

This created a three-way design

with two between-subjects variables (dependence and expectation) and one
We expected

within-subject variable (information consistency).

asymmetrically dependent subjects to use accuracy-oriented processes and
to individuate the other person.

In other words,

compared to non-

dependent subjects, asymmetrically dependent subjects should spend more
time attending to the inconsistent information, just as do symmetrically

dependent subjects.

In addition,

because asymmetrically dependent

discount
subjects are so strongly motivated to be accurate, they will

the information less often than the other subjects.
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Subjects

Ninety-two (65 females and 27 males) introductory psychology
students from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst received extra
credit for their participation.

Subjects were randomly assigned to one

of the six conditions created by the between-subjects variables.

subject's data were deleted due to experimenter error.

One

In addition,

the

data of two subjects who volunteered suspicion about the alleged other
subject, two subjects who understood English poorly, and 10 subjects who

were more than two and a half standard deviations above the median on
the critical variable of attention time were deleted from the

analyses.'

This left 77 subjects, 25-27 in each cell of the critical

two-way interaction between dependence

(a

between-subjects variable) and

information consistency (the within-subject variable).

Positivity of

expectancy was included as a counterbalancing variable to unconfound

consistency and positivity.
Procedure

When subjects arrived, the experimenter explained that the person
with whom they would be working was a non-student volunteer who had an

opportunity to earn some money by participating in the study.

This

alleged person, always the same sex as the subject, was working on the

preliminary stages of the experiment in another room with another
experimenter.

There were seven wind-up toys, paper, pen, and pencil on

the table that would presumably be used for the task.

were
The experimenter briefly explained that the researchers

looking at how people work together on a creative task.

So,

later in

up educational games
the study, the experimenter would ask them to think

for 8 year-olds using the wind-up toys.
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For example, subtraction could

be shown by winding up a toy and letting it hop away from the remaining

toys.

While explaining the task, the experimenter tried to convey that

skill and creativity would be helpful.

The subject and the volunteer

were to think of ideas alone at first.

In the

work together.

second step, they would

Supposedly, the experimenter would be comparing people's

performance alone versus their performance together.
Subjects then performed a bogus creativity task.

They had two

minutes in which to generate as many words as they could using the
letters from larger words.
for the later task.

The task supposedly warmed up the subjects

However, the true purpose of this activity was to

give subjects positive feedback and to boost their feeling of

competence.

This was done because previous research (Ruscher & Fiske,

1990) has shown that subjects low in self -perceived competence respond

differently than do subjects high in self -perceived competence.

Dependency Manipulation
The experimenter then informed subjects that, as extra incentive
and in an effort to make things similar for them and the volunteers,

they would also have an opportunity to earn some money.

In the no-

dependence condition, the volunteer received $10 merely for
participating, and the subjects were eligible for one of three $50
prizes for the most creative ideas based on their performance alone, in

the first phase of the study.
the volunteer received $10

In the asymmetrical -dependence condition,

merely for participating, and the subjects

performance
were eligible for one of three $50 prizes based on their

with their partner in the second phase of the study.

In the

subjects were
symmetrical -dependence condition, the volunteer and the

volunteers and
jointly eligible for one of six $50 prizes (three for

15

three for students) for the most creative ideas based on their

performance with their partner in the second phase of the study.
Subjects signed a form indicating that they understood how the prizes

would be awarded.
Expectancy Manipulation
The experimenter then told subjects that the researchers were also

interested in whether subjects knowing something about the person with

whom they worked would affect performance.

Due to time constraints, the

subjects would receive information about their volunteer partners, but

volunteer subjects would not receive information about the student
subjects.

The experimenter allegedly had some background information

about the volunteer partners available from a pre-testing session and

would not have to take additional time gathering the information.
Supposedly, complex statistical analyses made it possible to look at how

information affected only one person in a two-person pair.

After this explanation, subjects received
volunteer.

a summary report on the

The summary report listed the volunteer's high school grade

point average and scores on a number of creativity and skill tests.

One

version of the summary report portrayed a competent person (positive
expectation) and the other portrayed an incompetent person (negative

expectation).

Subjects looked over this summary sheet while the

experimenter went down the hall allegedly to pick up some additional
information from the volunteer.

Consistency of Information Manipulation
go
After the experimenter returned, the subjects were asked to

given the
through the information that the volunteer had supposedly

experimenter to supplement the test scores.
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The experimenter told the

subjects that their initial reactions to this information was of
interest to the researchers.

reactions on an audiotape.

Thus, they would like to record their

After reassuring subjects of the anonymity

of their responses, especially with respect to the fictitious other
person, the experiment asked subjects to read each piece of information

aloud and to comment about it.
This information consisted of ten sentences the volunteer had

supposedly written.

Five of the sentences were consistent with

competence and inconsistent with incompetence.

The other five sentences

were consistent with incompetence and inconsistent with competence.
These statements, which were based on statements used in previous

research (Ruscher, 1991), were pretested (see Appendix A) and are

available in Appendix B.

The sentences appeared in a different random

order for each subject, with the stipulation that no more than two

competency or two incompetency statements appeared consecutively.
When subjects finished commenting on the information about the
volunteer, they completed a short questionnaire (see Appendix C)

.

On

11-point bipolar scales, subjects rated how competent, likable, and good
at the task the fictitious volunteer was.

In addition,

subjects rated

their own competency at the task, their perceived control, and how happy
they were with their partner.

Subjects also rated how much their

individual and their joint performance would affect the distribution of
the prizes.

Finally, subjects rated the consistency, clarity, and

positivity of their impression of the fictitious other person.

A second

purpose of the
part of the questionnaire asked subjects to recall the

experiment and comment on the study so far.

Once this questionnaire was

suspicion and debriefed
completed, the experimenter probed subjects for
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them.

A random drawing for the three $50 prizes was held when the study

was completed.

Data from protocols.

From the audiotapes, the experimenter

recorded the number of seconds subjects considered each piece of
information.

The experimenter was blind to condition.

commenced when subjects began to read each statement.

Timing always
Subjects' tape-

recorded comments were then coded into discrete categories (see Table
1).

In addition,

because of the specific hypotheses here, the comments

were also coded for discounting.

To assess reliability of the coding

scheme, another individual, who was also blind to condition, coded a

random third of the protocols; 809 comments were used to assess

reliability of the coding scheme.

Cohen's kappa coefficients were

computed for each code type are as follows:

dispositions, k=.84;

elaborations, k=.81; evaluations, k=.94; hedging, k=.98; attribute
matching, k=.72; repetitions, k=.79; self-reference, k=.88; no comment,
k=1.00; and discounting, k=.80 (median k=.84).

Results

Manipulation Checks
An aggregate measure of subjects' perceptions of the fictitious

other's positivity was computed from five items on the questionnaire:

competence of the other, likability of the other, how well the other
the other,
would do on the task, positivity of subjects' impressions of

partner.
and how happy the subjects were having the other as their

As

rated the othe
expected, subjects in the competent expectancy condition
in the incompetent
person more positively (M=8.61) than did subjects

£<.0001.
expectancy condition (M=6.84), F(l,71)=34.15,
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Further, as expected, there was a main effect for dependence
on
the questionnaire measure of how much the joint performance of the

subject and the fictitious other would affect the distribution of the
prizes, F(2,71)=5.03, £<.01.

An a priori contrast indicated that

subjects in the non-dependence condition rated the influence of their
joint performance significantly lower (M=5.82) than subjects in the
asymmetrical and symmetrical dependence conditions (Ms=8.04 and 7.92,

respectively), F(l,75)=10.02, fi<.01.

This accurately reflects the

instructions these subjects were given.

It also indicates that subjects

perceived the reward contingencies for the asymmetrical and symmetrical

dependence situations as similar.
Timed Attention
The total number of seconds subjects attended to attribute

information was entered into a 2X2X2 mixed-model analysis of variance
(ANOVA)

:

Dependence (none, asymmetrical, symmetrical) X Expectation

(positive, negative) X Information Consistency (expectancy-consistent,

expectancy-inconsistent).

This analysis yielded the predicted

dependence by information consistency interaction, F(2,71)=3.99, £<.05,
indicating that attention to inconsistent information increased from no
(M=74.19) to asymmetrical

(M=77.01) to symmetrical

(M=77.78) dependence

and that attention to consistent information decreased from no (M=78.96)
to asymmetrical

Figure 1).

(M=76.51) to symmetrical

(M=74.93) dependence (see

An a priori contrast indicated that, compared to subjects in

the no-dependence condition, subjects in the symmetrical -dependence

condition spent more time on inconsistent than consistent information,
F(l,75)=3.99, £<.05.

A test of the residual was not significant, F<1,

indicating that the interaction was linear.
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Subjects in the

asymmetrical -dependence condition spent about equal time on inconsistent
and consistent information.

Think-aloud Protocols
For each comment type described in Table

1

that accounted for more

than 10% of the total comments made, the number of such comments served
as the dependent variable entered into a 2X2X2 mixed-model ANOVA, using

the independent variables noted above.

Discounting .

As originally predicted, the ANOVA yielded a main

effect for dependence.

Asymmetrically dependent subjects discounted the

information the least (M=1.13), while symmetrically dependent subjects
and non-dependent subjects discounted the information more often

(Ms=2.06 and 2.36, respectively), F(2,71)=3.45, £<.05.

An a priori

contrast provided further support that asymmetrically dependent subjects

discounted the information less often than the other subjects,
F(l,75)=6.43, fi<.05.
Two higher order effects were also present.

A two-way interaction

between expectancy and consistency indicated that negative expectancy
subjects discounted consistent information more than inconsistent and
that positive expectancy subjects discounted inconsistent information

more than consistent F(l,71)=81.27, e<.0001.

In

other words, negative

information was discounted more often (M=2.92) than positive information
(M=0.83).

Thus, it seems subjects attempted to make their partner

appear positive.

People would prefer to work with people they find

competent than people they find incompetent.

In addition,

a three-way

reflected the
interaction among dependence, expectancy, and consistency
F(2,71)=4.61,
combined influence of the two other significant effects,

£<.05.

more than
While all subjects discounted negative information
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positive, the asymmetrically dependent subjects discounted
both the

negative (M=1.69) and positive information (M=0.56) less than
the not

dependent (negative M=3.74 and positive M=0.09) or symmetrically
dependent subjects (negative M=3.21 and positive M=0.91).

Other Comments.

A two-way interaction between expectancy and

consistency indicated that negative expectancy subjects were more likely
to make dispositional comments about inconsistent information and

positive expectancy subjects were more likely to make dispositional
comments about consistent information, F(l,71)=36.42, b<.0001.

So, more

dispositional comments were made about positive information (M=5.35)
than negative information (M=3.78).

Once again, subjects were more

likely to attribute positive than negative attributes to their partner's

disposition.
All

subjects made more elaborations about negative information

(M=4.39) than positive information (M=2.94), as indicated by another

two-way interaction between expectancy and consistency, F(l,71)=18.93,
£<.0001.

Many of these elaborations about negative information were

elaborations that discounted the negative information.

Again, subjects

tried to make their partner appear a competent other.
In addition,

a two-way interaction between expectancy and

information indicated that subjects hedged more often on negative
information (M=4.83) than positive information (M=4.08), F(l,71)=9.77,
£<.01.

Once again, the subjects seemed uncomfortable with the negative

information.^

Consistency
Finally, a contrast indicated that asymmetrically dependent
than
subjects (M=5.36) tended to rate the information as less consistent
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the other subjects (not dependent M=6.78 and symmetrically dependent

M=6.52), F(l,75)=3.46, £=.07.

This seems to demonstrate that

asymmetrical subjects recognized the actual variability of the comments

more accurately than other subjects.
Summary and Conclusions
As anticipated, relative to non-dependent subjects, asymmetrically

dependent subjects increased their attention to expectancy-inconsistent
information, just as do symmetrically dependent subjects.

In addition,

attention to expectancy-consistent information decreased from no to
asymmetrical to symmetrical dependence conditions.

In addition,

asymmetrically dependent subjects discounted the information less often
than the other subjects.

Thus, the behavior of the subjects

substantiates the hypothesis that asymmetrically dependent subjects

would be motivated to use accuracy-oriented processes and to individuate
the other person in an attempt to regain lost prediction and control.

Furthermore, it seemed as though all subjects wanted to view the

other person in a positive light.

They discounted, elaborated, and

hedged about the negative information, while they made dispositional

attributions about the positive information.
want to view

a

This natural tendency to

partner as competent rather than incompetent may have

been motivated by the subjects' drive to maintain their self-esteem.

An

incompetent partner may be somewhat threatening to self-esteem.
positive
Both the motivation to seek information about and to be
losses to peoples'
about the other may grow stronger with additional

prediction and control.

Evaluatively dependent individuals lose

prediction and control over their outcomes and, to

a

greater degree than

sense of self-esteem.
asymmetrically dependent individuals, over their

22

Thus, evaluatively dependent individuals would probably be strongly

motivated to interpret information about the powerful other on whom
depend in a positive manner.

The next study addresses this point.

23

Table

1.

Content Categories for Subjects' Comments
about Target Information

Category

Disposition
Elaboration

Explanation

Inference about target's traits, tendencies, likes.

Interpretation of what the information means or
impl ies.

Evaluation

Evaluation without interpretation.

Hedging

Comment not directed at anything in particular.
pause filled with "well
uh."

Attribute

Attempt to match information to prior knowledge of
target.

Repetition

Verbatim or paraphrased restatement.

Self -reference

Self-comparison, reference to self, opinions.

No comment

No comment made or subject says "no comment."

Discounting

Changing the valence of the information or making an
excuse for it.
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3

EXPERIMENT 2

Method

Overview
An experimenter led subjects to believe that their performance

would (asymmetrical evaluative dependence) or would not (no dependence)
be evaluated by a fictitious other, whom they expected to meet.

In

addition, the experimenter told the subjects they would be eligible for
a prize based on the evaluation of their performance.

The fictitious

subject was initially portrayed as competent (positive expectation) or

incompetent (negative expectation)^.

Subjects then received both

positive and negative (expectancy-consistent and expectancyinconsistent) information about the fictitious subject and voiced their

reactions to that information into

a tape recorder.

This created a

three-way design with two between-subjects variables (dependence and
expectation) and one within-subject variable (consistency of
information).

We expected evaluatively dependent subjects to

inaccurately, selectively encode information about the other person in

order to make the other person seem more positive.

In

other words,

evaluatively dependent subjects should discount the negative information
more than non-dependent subjects.

Subjects
Fifty-three (35 females and 18 males) introductory psychology
extra
students from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst received

credit for their participation.

Subjects were randomly assigned to one

variables.
of the four conditions created by the between-subjects

The

about the alleged other
data of two subjects who volunteered suspicion
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subject, three subjects who understood English poorly, and three

subjects who were more than two and a half standard deviations above the

median on the critical variable of attention time were deleted from the
analyses.*

This left 45 subjects, 22-23 in each cell of the critical

two-way interaction between dependence

(a

between-subjects variable) and

consistency of information (the within-subject variable).

Positivity of

expectancy was included as a counterbalancing variable to unconfound

consistency and positivity.
Procedure

When subjects arrived, the experimenter explained that
study undergraduate was also participating in the study. ^

a work-

This alleged

person, always the same sex as the subject, was waiting in another room.

There were seven wind-up toys, paper, pen, and pencil on the table that

would presumably be needed for the task.
The experimenter briefly explained that the researchers were

looking at how discussion affects performance on a creative task.

So,

later in the study, the experimenter would ask them to think up ways to

communicate concepts using the wind-up toys.

For instance, subtraction

could be shown by winding up a toy and letting it hop away from the

remaining toys.

Supposedly, the experimenter would be comparing the

performance of two groups of subjects--one group of people who discuss

their ideas and another group of people who do not discuss their ideas.
Thus, some people in the study would be having a discussion with the

fictitious other person and other subjects would not.
Subjects then performed the bogus creativity task used earlier,

supposedly to get warmed up for the later task.
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However, as in the

first study, the true purpose of this activity was to give
subjects

positive feedback and to boost their feeling of competence.

Dependency Manipulation
The experimenter then told the subjects that they happened to be
in the condition of the study where they would have the discussion with

the fictitious other person.

In fact,

all

of the subjects were in this

"condition."
The experimenter proceeded to inform subjects that, supposedly as
a way to thank subjects for their time and effort, a number of $20

prizes^ would be distributed for the most creative ideas.

In the no-

dependence condition, the research supervisor would be awarding the
prizes.

In the

evaluative-dependence condition, the fictitious other

person with whom the subjects would be discussing their ideas would be

awarding the prizes.

Subjects signed a form indicating that they

understood how the prizes would be awarded.
Expectancy Manipulation
The experimenter then told subjects that, in an effort to make the

study more like a real -life work situation, they would be receiving some

information about the person with whom they would be discussing their
ideas.

The first piece of information would be a brief statement

written by the other person explaining how well this person expected to
This statement served to manipulate subjects'

do in the discussion.

expectancy for the other person.
read:

"To be honest,

I

think

I

a teaching assistant for several

The competent expectancy statement

might be pretty good at this.

semesters now and I've done pretty

well, especially with things like this."

statement read:

"To be honest,

I've been

The incompetent expectancy

I'm not sure if I'll be any good at
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this.

I

was a teaching assistant last semester, but

I

didn't to so

great, especially with things like this."

Consistency of Information Manipulation

After the subjects read this statement, the experimenter explained
that the next bit of information would be ten comments taken from an
informal evaluation of the person when that person was a teaching

assistant.

The experimenter also explained that this was the first time

information from a teaching evaluation had been used in a study.

Thus,

the researchers were interested in subjects' reactions to the

information and would like to record their initial responses to it on an
audiotape.

After reassuring subjects of the anonymity of their

responses, especially with respect to the fictitious other person, the

experiment asked subjects to read each piece of information aloud and to
comment about it.
This information was mixed.

Five of the sentences were consistent

with the positive expectancy (competence) and the other five sentences

were consistent with the negative expectancy (incompetence).

These

statements, which were based on statements used in previous research
(Erber & Fiske, 1984; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990). were pretested (see

Appendix D) and are available in Appendix

E.

The sentences appeared in

a different random order for each subject, with the stipulation that no

more than two positive or two negative statements appeared
consecutively.

When subjects finished commenting on the information about the
volunteer, they completed a short questionnaire (see Appendix F).

On

likable, and
nine-point bipolar scales, subjects rated how competent,

good at the discussion the fictitious other was.
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In addition,

subjects

rated their own competency at the task and their perceived control.

A

second part of the questionnaire asked subjects to recall the purpose of
the experiment and comment on the study so far.

Once this questionnaire

was completed, the experimenter probed subjects for suspicion and

debriefed them.

A random drawing for the three $20 prizes was held when

the study was completed.

Data from protocols
before.

.

Attention and comments were assessed as

To assess reliability, a second individual coded a random third

of the protocols; 597 comments were used to assess reliability of the

coding scheme.

Cohen's kappa coefficients were computed for each code

type are as follows:

dispositions, k=.81; elaborations, k=.84;

evaluations, k=.82; hedging, k=.98; attribute matching, k=.78;
repetitions, k=.66; self-reference, k=1.00; no comment, k=1.00; and

discounting, k=.85 (median k=.84).
Results

Manipulation Checks
A measure of subjects' perception of how well the fictitious other

expected to do in the discussion indicated that the expectancy

manipulation worked.

Subjects in the positive expectancy condition

expected the other person to do better in the discussion (M=7.64) than
subjects in the negative expectancy condition (M=4.78), F(l,41)=57.22,
£<.0001.
Further, there was a main effect for dependence on the
over
questionnaire measure of how much control the other person had

whether the subject won the prize, F(2,41)=75.40, fi<.0001.

Subjects who

had less control
were not dependent indicated that the other person
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(M=2.64) than subjects who were evaluatively dependent
{M=7.18).

This

accurately reflects the instructions these subjects were given.
Timed Attention
The total number of seconds subjects attended to attribute

information was entered into a 2X2X2 mixed-model analysis of variance
(ANOVA):

Dependence (none, evaluative) X Expectation (positive,

negative) X Information Consistency (positive, negative).

yielded only one significant effect:

This analysis

an interaction between expectancy

and consistency of information, F(l,41)=19.58, £<.001, indicating that

subjects in the positive expectancy condition spent more time on

inconsistent information than consistent information and that subjects
in the negative expectancy condition spent more time on consistent

information than inconsistent information.

Overall, all subjects spent

more time on negative (M=79.75) than positive information (M=70.45).
A great deal of person perception research has

This is not unusual.

indicated that, in general, negative information is considered more

informative than positive information (see Skowronski & Carlston, 1989).

Think-aloud Protocols
For each comment type described in Table

1

that accounted for more

than 10% of the total comments made, the number of such comments served
as the dependent variable entered into a 2X2X2 mixed-model ANOVA, using

the independent variables noted above.

Discounting

.

As predicted, the ANOVA yielded a two-way

interaction between expectancy and consistency similar to the
interaction on timed attention, F(l,41)=19.81, fi<.001.

It indicated

more often than
that subjects discounted negative information (M=2.56)

positive information (M=0.067).

In addition,
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a three-way interaction

among expectancy, dependence, and consistency,
F(l,41)=4.05, e=.05,

indicated that, while both non-dependent and
evaluatively dependent
subjects discounted more negative (M=1.41 and M=3.70,
respectively) than

positive (M=0.045 and M=0.087, respectively) information,
this

difference was much larger for evaluatively dependent subjects
(see
Figure 2).'
£<.05.

There was also a main effect for dependence, F(l,41)=4.41,

Overall, evaluatively dependent subjects discounted the

information more (M=1.89) than non-dependent subjects (M=0.73).

As

hypothesized, this may have been in an effort to interpret the

information about the evaluator in

Other Comments

.

a positive manner.

The only other significant effects for the

comments were interactions between expectancy and consistency.

These

interactions were similar to the two presented above for timed attention
and discounting.

As above, here they are presented in terms of

information valence rather than consistency.

More dispositional

comments were made about the positive information (M=4.62) than the

negative information (M=2.47), F(l,41)=34.16, fi<.0001.

More

elaborations were made about negative information (M=5.22) than positive
More evaluative comments

information (M=4.24), F(l,41)=4.88, £<.05.

were made about positive information (M=1.47) than negative information
(M=l.ll), F(l,41)=5.05, £<.05.

Finally, more hedges were made about

negative information (M=5.78) than positive information (M=4.38),
F(l,41)=22.03, £<.0001.

As in Experiment

1,

these findings seem to

indicate that subjects preferred to view the other person in

rather than a negative manner.

a positive

While they discounted, elaborated, and

hedged about the negative information, they preferred to make
dispositional inferences and comment on the valence of the positive
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comments.

The subjects seemed more comfortable
with the positive

aspects of the other.

Inaccuracy

While subjects accurately indicated that the
fictitious other
person in the positive expectancy condition would do better
in the

discussion than the fictitious other person in the negative
expectancy
condition as described in the manipulation check section above, there
were other inaccuracies on this measure.

Overall, evaluatively

dependent subjects thought the other person would do better in the

discussion (M=7.00) than did non-dependent subjects (M=5.64),
F(l,41)=11.14, fi<.01.

A two-way interaction between dependence and

expectancy. F(l,41)=7.13, fi<.05 (see Figure 3), indicated that both non-

dependent and evaluatively dependent subjects in the positive expectancy
condition accurately perceived the other's competence and rated it high
(M=7.73 and M=8.0, respectively).

However, in the negative expectancy

condition, only the non-dependent subjects recognized the other person's

incompetence (M=3.55).

The evaluatively dependent subjects rated the

incompetent other as fairly competent (M=6.0).

Thus, the evaluatively

dependent subjects inaccurate perception of the other person's

competence in the negative expectancy condition drove the main effect
for dependence.
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CHAPTER 4

DISCUSSION

The results of these two experiments suggest that task
dependent
and evaluatively dependent individuals process information about
powerful others in two different ways.

Task dependent individuals are

motivated to attend to information both inconsistent and consistent with
initial expectations about the powerful other.

The decrease in

attention to consistent information relative to non-dependent

individuals is interesting because it indicates that less expectancy

confirming processing is occurring.

The increase in attention to

inconsistent information relative to non-dependent individuals is of

particular interest because it is a necessary condition for more
individuating processes.

Moreover, these individuating processes of

impression formation are particularly accuracy-oriented, and all the

information is considered equally.

Task dependent individuals discount

the information less often than either non-dependent or symmetrically

dependent individuals.

These results largely confirm the original

predictions.
On the other hand, evaluatively dependent individuals work with

information about the powerful other quite differently.

They are not

particularly concerned with information consistent or inconsistent with
prior expectancies.

Instead, they spend most of their effort on any

negative information that is available.

Evaluatively dependent

individuals discount this negative information and are motivated to form
a positive impression of the powerful

predictions were largely confirmed.
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other.

Again, the original

Issues of Prediction and Control

The different processes of impression formation used by
task and

evaluatively dependent individuals seem to be a consequence of
different
levels of prediction and control.

Neither is exactly like those

processes found under conditions of symmetrical dependence.
Asymmetrical dependence is characterized by less control than
symmetrical dependence.

Asymmetrically dependent individuals, by

definition, have no control over the other's outcomes.

Yet, conditions

of task dependence do give the dependent person an opportunity to work

with the powerful other.

Thus, the powerless person could gain some

control over outcomes by influencing the powerful other.

However, there

is no guarantee that the powerful other would be receptive to this

influence.

Therefore, it is in the powerless person's best interest to

have accurate information about the powerful person in order to predict

behavior.

This accurate information provides the powerless person with

some sense of control or at least prediction over outcomes.
In the evaluatively dependent case,

the powerless person not only

loses prediction and control over outcomes, but also over self-esteem

maintenance.

The evaluator has the ability to give negative feedback.

This threat to self-esteem, not just to tangible outcomes, motivates the

powerless to view the evaluator in positive manner.

A competent

evaluator would be less likely to threaten the powerless person's
feelings of self -worth than a incompetent evaluator.

Thus,

in an

attempt to regain prediction and control over self-esteem, the powerless
are motivated to use inaccurate processes of impression formation and to

engage in wishful thinking.
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Impression Formation

According to Fiske and Neuberg's (1990) continuum model
of
impression formation, people shift toward more individuating
processes
only when they are motivated to do so.

Research has shown that this

shift toward the individuating processes of impression formation does

occur under conditions of symmetrical dependence (Berscheid et al.,
1976;

Erber & Fiske, 1984; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990;

Ruscher et al., 1991).

Experiment

1

provides evidence that task

asymmetrically dependent individuals are also motivated to shift toward
the individuating processes of impression formation.

In fact,

they seem

to use even more accuracy-oriented processes than symmetrically

dependent individuals.

Alternatively, the absence of an increase in

timed attention in Experiment 2 indicates that evaluatively dependent

individuals do not use quite as many individuating processes.

Yet, they

do think about the information differently than non-dependent subjects.

They are motivated to think wishfully about the powerful other.

Interestingly, unlike the findings in previous research on
symmetrical dependency (Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990;

Ruscher et al., 1991), these studies did not show an increase in
dispositional inferences about inconsistent information.

However, both

studies did show an increase in dispositional inferences about positive

information, which may indicate that asymmetrical dependence has strong

implications for subjects' self-esteem.

Therefore, they attempted to

view the powerful other in a positive manner by making dispositional

inferences about the positive information.
powerful
It would be interesting to be able to make more

comparisons between the cases of task and evaluative dependence.

38

Unfortunately, these two conditions were not
included in the same study.
This semester a study including both cases will be
conducted.

Impression formation in conditions of asymmetrical
dependence are

currently being studied.

This research on the powerless person in

asymmetrical dyads, Goodwin and Fiske's research on the powerful
person
in asymmetrical

dyads, and Depret and Fiske's research on the powerless

in asymmetrical

groups has worked to fill the gap.

As a result, we are

better able to understand how people cope in unequal power
relationships.
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APPENDIX A

PRETEST CONSISTENCY RATINGS OF STIMULI FOR EXPERIMENT

Sentence
Intel

igent

Negative
Positive
Expectation Expectation

1

F(l,27)

El

2.9

9.2

52.37

.0001

Thorough

3.7

8.7

33.27

.0001

Disciplined

4.1

8.8

33.56

.0001

Conscientious

3.7

8.1

27.01

.0001

Motivated

3.3

8.9

61.53

.0001

Irresponsible

8.8

4.1

39.27

.0001

Vague

7.9

4.0

25.43

.0001

Inefficient

7.5

3.8

19.18

.0005

Nitpicking

7.5

5.1

8.02

Sloppy

7.9

4.2

30.29

1

.01

.0001

Measured on an 11-point scale (l=completely inconsistent, ll=completely
consistent)
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APPENDIX B
STIMULI FOR EXPERIMENT

1

Information cons istent with positive expectancy
E.G. thinks that
school

G.M. thinks that
projects.

I

am intelligent because

I

am thorough because

got good grades in hi

I

do a lot of research on my

I

J.L. thinks that I am disciplined because
done and am not easily distracted.

focus on what needs to be

I

B.H. thinks that I am conscientious because
my work done on time.

S.V. thinks that I am motivated because
through my lunch hour.

I

I

always worry about getting

often start work early or work

Information consistent with negative expectancy
E.D. thinks that I am irresponsible because
through on all my projects.
L.G. thinks that
clearly.

S.P. thinks that
does.

don't always follow

never explain my ideas

I

am vague because he says

I

I

am inefficient because

don't work as fast as she

I
am nitpicking because
forget when they make a mistake.

B.M. thinks that

L.R. thinks that

I

I

am sloppy because
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I

I

I

usually don't let people

don't keep my files in order.

APPENDIX

C

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR EXPERIMENT
Part

1

I

Your responses are completely confidential.

Please be honest.

Please list some personality traits you think characterize this
1.
person.

You have received some information about the person with whom you
2.
will be working in a few minutes.
Do you think this information will be
useful for your interaction with this person?

23456789

1

very
useless
3.

In general,

10

11

very
useful

how competent do you think the person with whom you'll

23456789

be working is?
1

very
incompetent
4.

11

very
competent

general, how likable do you think the person with whom you'll be

In

working is?
1

very
unlikable
5.

10

23456789

123456789

10

11

very
lik^ble

How well do you think you will do in this study?

very
poorly

10

11

very
w^l^
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T

How well do you think the person with whom
6.
you'll
in this study?

be workinga will do
«

123456789

10

11

very
^^^y

poorly

How much impact will your individual performance (i.e., your
7.
performance alone) have on whether or not you win one of the prizes?

123456789

10

very
little

11

very
n,^^ch

How much impact will your joint performance (i.e., your performance
8.
with the other person) have on whether or not you win one of the prizes?

123456789

10

very
little

11

very
much

How much control do you think you have over how you will do in this
study?

9.

1

very
little

23456789

10.
How much control
in this study?
1

very
little

10

11

very
much

do you think your partner has over how you will do

23456789

10

11

very
much

How consistent or inconsistent was the information you received
about you partner?
11.

1

very
inconsistent

12.

23456789

123456789

10

11

very
consistent

How clear or unclear is your impression of your partner?

very
unclear
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10

11

very
clear

13.

How positive or negative is your impression of your
partner?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

very
negative

8

9

10

11

very
positive

14.
How happy or unhappy do you feel about having this person as your
partner?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

very
unhappy

11

very
happy

Part II
1.

Based on what you remeinber, please briefly describe the study.

We are always interested in any comments, ideas, or predictions
If you have any, please describe them
people have about our studies.
below.

2.
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APPENDIX D

PRETEST CONSISTENCY RATINGS OF STIMULI FOR EXPERIMENT 2

Sentence
ever

Negative
Positive
Expectation Expectation

F(1.30)

E<

3.50

5.44

7.91

Persi stence

3.38

6.56

22.64

Quickly

3.63

5.63

6.69

Efficient

3.81

6.56

12.57

.005

Relaxed

3.81

6.19

12.21

.005

Irresponsi bl e

0.44

3 .05

15.63

.0005

Vague

5.69

3.69

6.91

.05

Superficial

6.00

4.13

4.75

.05

Nitpicking

5.63

4.06

4.70

.05

Sloppy

5.38

3.13

8.84

.01

CI

.01

.0001
.05

Measured on a nine-point scale (l=completely inconsistent. 9=conipletely
consistent)
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APPENDIX

E

STIMULI FOR EXPERIMENT 2

Information
I

con«;i

stent with positive expectancy

thought the TA sometimes had very clever answers to questions.

I thought the TA had just the right amount
of persistence when trvinq to
relate an idea to the class.

liked how quickly the TA went through the material without omitting
any important points.
I

The TA was efficient and usually got the homework graded way ahead of
time.
The TA appeared to be relaxed during teaching.

Information consistent with negative expectancy
From the amount of preparation and the level of organization,
say that the TA was an irresponsible instructor.
I

I

would

thought the TA was sort of vague when explaining things.

The TA took a superficial approach to teaching, not showing a lot of
interest in the subject.
In the discussion section, the TA spent a lot of time nitpicking at
minor details.

The TA was sloppy and had illegible handwriting.
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APPENDIX

F

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR EXPERIMENT 2
Part

I

Your responses are completely confidential.

Please be honest.

You have received some information about Chris, the person
1.
with whom
you will discuss your ideas. Do you think this information will
be
useful for interaction later?
1

2

3

8

not at all
useful
2.

extremely
useful

How likable is Chris?
1

2

3

8

extremely
unl ikable
3.

extremely
likable

How competent is Chris?
1

2

3

9

very
incompetent

very
competent

4.

Please list some personality traits you think characterize Chris.

5.

How well do you think you will do on the upcoming task?

123456789

very
well

very
poorly
6.

?
How much control do you think you have over whether you win a prize

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

complete
control

no control
at all
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How much control do you think Chris has over whether you win
prize?
7.

123456789
123456789

no control

8.

complete
control

How well does Chris expect to do in your discussion?

not very
well
9.

a

very

well

How good a TA was Chris?
1

2

3

4

5

not very
good

6

7

8

9

very
good

Part II
1.
Based on what you remember from the explanation of the study, please
briefly describe the study.

We are always interested in any comments, ideas, or prediction
If you have any, please describe them
people have about our studies.
below.

2.
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ENDNOTES

Of the
1.
expectancy
condition,
condition,
condition,
condition,
expectancy

deleted subjects, one was in the no dependence-positive
condition, two were in the no dependence-negative expectancy
four were in the asymmetrical dependence-positive expectancy
two were in the asymmetrical dependence-negative expectancy
four were in the symmetrical dependence-positive expectancy
and two were in the symmetrical dependence-negative
condition.

Two other significant interaction, theoretically uninteresting, are
not discussed here. Subjects expecting an incompetent other made more
elaborations than subjects expecting a competent other, F(l,71)=9.32,
£<.01.
No and asymmetrically interdependent subjects hedged more often
that symmetrically interdependent subjects, F(l,71)=3.06, £=.05.
2.

Of course,
3.
in a partner.

competence has a different meaning in an evaluator than
One would appreciate an extremely competent partner, but
may shy away from an evaluator who was too competent. Thus, our
competency manipulation was made a little weaker in Experiment 2.
Of the
expectancy
expectancy
expectancy
expectancy
4.

deleted subjects, one was in the no dependence-positive
condition, three were in the no dependence-negative
condition, two were in the evaluative dependence-positive
condition, and two were in the evaluative dependence-negative
condition.

We opted against using a non-student because we wanted the subjects
to believe that the same person would be evaluating all the subjects.
It was easier to convince them that a work-study student would be
available every time a subject was run than a non-student volunteer.

5.

The amount of the prize was reduced in this study because a
preliminary study indicated that it took less monetary incentive to get
subjects invested in an evaluative dependence task than in an
asymmetrical dependence task.

6.

For simplicity of presentation this interaction is collapsed over
consistency and expectancy. The data is presented in terms of
information valence.
7.
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